Abstract
In his article "On Sportsmanship and 'Running Up the Score'," Nicholas Dixon argues against a widely held view of sporting behavior. He disputes the merit of what he calls the "anti-blowout" (AB) thesis.
Dixon claims that several current models of sportsmanship provide no clear arguments in support of the AB thesis. He argues conversely that the margin of victory between opponents is not an ethical issue intrinsic to competitive games. His main claim is that the AB thesis is based on two misconceptions about sport. The first is to think that "winning is the only thing that matters," while the second is to believe that "a heavy defeat is a serious affront to one's humanity or to one's status as an athlete".
We will construct our defense of the AB thesis by arguing against Dixon's
particular and general claims. In part II we review Dixon's analysis and challenge three of its claims. Part III delves into the moral psychology of competitive sport in an attempt to understand the significance of sporting victory and defeat. In part IV we argue that downgrading the importance of winning to the extent that running up the score becomes a meaningless matter is objectionable because it is an outlook that could only be countenanced by a culture that nurtures bland indifference and dispassionate detachment toward sport.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the AB thesis should be upheld because it takes seriously the significant underlying cultural perception that, for many, self-esteem is related to comparative sporting ability. Finally, our postscript will suggest that the best way to prevent running up the score from becoming a morally problematic issue is to cultivate a proliferation of divergent and important social practices that will allow individuals to develop self-worth by crafting distinctive personal talents.
Dixon claims that several current models of sportsmanship provide no clear arguments in support of the AB thesis. He argues conversely that the margin of victory between opponents is not an ethical issue intrinsic to competitive games. His main claim is that the AB thesis is based on two misconceptions about sport. The first is to think that "winning is the only thing that matters," while the second is to believe that "a heavy defeat is a serious affront to one's humanity or to one's status as an athlete".
We will construct our defense of the AB thesis by arguing against Dixon's
particular and general claims. In part II we review Dixon's analysis and challenge three of its claims. Part III delves into the moral psychology of competitive sport in an attempt to understand the significance of sporting victory and defeat. In part IV we argue that downgrading the importance of winning to the extent that running up the score becomes a meaningless matter is objectionable because it is an outlook that could only be countenanced by a culture that nurtures bland indifference and dispassionate detachment toward sport.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the AB thesis should be upheld because it takes seriously the significant underlying cultural perception that, for many, self-esteem is related to comparative sporting ability. Finally, our postscript will suggest that the best way to prevent running up the score from becoming a morally problematic issue is to cultivate a proliferation of divergent and important social practices that will allow individuals to develop self-worth by crafting distinctive personal talents.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 58-69 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | Journal of the Philosophy of Sport |
Volume | 23 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs |
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Publication status | Published - 1996 |
Externally published | Yes |