Between Phenomenology and Neuroscience

Robert Pepperell*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

It would seem reasonable to expect any comprehensive account of consciousness to accommodate two of its most fundamental attributes: that we have a self- centred sense of experience and that this sense is somehow linked to the condition of our physiology. Yet those conversant with post-Cartesian philosophy will know that time and again significant doubts have been raised about any apparently obvious link between mind and body. So of all the questions implicated in the scientific study of consciousness perhaps the most pressing is to what extent, if at all, does our mental life correlate with biochemical activity at the neuronal level? Until this is resolved we will be unable to reconcile the data gathered from phenomenological analysis of introspective experience with that derived from neuroscientific analysis of brain behaviour. The infamous gap will persist.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)85-88
Number of pages4
JournalJournal of Consciousness Studies
Volume10
Issue number11
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2003
Externally publishedYes

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